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fREFACE 
Very little scientific material is available 
in the English language on the subject of child-
ren's lies, although, because of the evident un-
iversality of the problem many discussions of the 
subject may be found. Very many of these find what 
scientific basis they have in the study "Children's 
Lies" made by G. Stanley Hall and first published 
in the American Journal of Psychology in 1890. In 
his report Hall makes~me tentative conclusions 
which are valuable when proper discount has been 
made for the fact that the study was not very system-
atic, for the limitation in age range (most of the 300 
children questioned by their teachers in the inquiry 
were 12 to 14 years of age) and for the difference in 
interest, trustworthiness and experience of the many 
teachers who gathered the material. 
The inquiry, with Hall's interpretation, :r-epresents 
very good acouting into the problem.and its worth as 
a pioneer study has earned for it a place as a class-
ic in its field, yet its present place as the court 
of last and only resort is not justified. Because of 
the nature of the problem it is necessarily rather de-
pendent upon observation and questionaire for data, a 
.. ~ .... ---.... 
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limitation which probably accouhts for the lack of 
interest in the gubject, on the part of the rather • 
exact science of child study as represented by Amer-
ican psyohologists,a lack of interest evidenced by 
the fact that Hall's research is still the outstand-
ing one on the subject in this country. 
Jfn England the very interesting chapter on "ibe 
Raw Material of Morality" by Sully in his book "Stud-
ies of Childhood" offers still less scientific evidence 
for its conclusions than does Hall's work, and in France 
"Le Yensonge" by Duprat compares with Hall's. There 
have been a number of notably worthwhile additions to 
the literature on the subJect, in Germany outstanding 
. (1) 
among them c. and w. Stern's admirable study, Errinn-
erung, Aussage and Luege. This is a report and inter-
pretation of the stenographically recorded statements 
of their three children from infancy until the age of 
nine of the oldest. 
liote: (1) 
Stern, author of Psychology of "Early Childhood", a 
translation of which is a much used American textbook, 
nnd editor of the "Zeitschrift ~1r Pad. Pay. experiment-
ella P~agogik und jugendkundliche Forschung" is probably 
the most-outstanding representative of the science of 
child study in Germany. 
l 
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The works of Schroetter, "Zur Psychologie und Logik 
• (1) 
der Luge", Lewinsky, " Zur Psychologie der wissent-
( 2} 
lichen Taeuschung", Baumgarten, " Die Luege bei 
. (3) 
Kindem und Jugendlichen", ( Buehler, "Gibt es Faelle 
( 4) 
in denen man luegen muss?" with a number of others, 
make the study~German psychological literature rewarding 
to the student of this particular problem. 
The last two mentioned studies represent the repo~ts 
and interpretations of two inquiries among larger groups 
of children·. The former made by a Swiss psychologist in Poland 
in 1912 was published in Germany and republished in 1926 
because of the interest it aroused and the important place 
done 
it achieved in its field. This piece of research was/at 
the instance of the Polish Child Study Association and 
makes use of the answers of 553 children to a questionaire, 
given to all by the psychologist, F. Baumgarten, herself. 
The last mentioned inquiry received its impetus through 
the interest of the superintendent of experimental schools, 
in Vienna, and was made by a specially prepared teacher, 
Johanna Haas, under the guidance of the Psychologisches 
Institut of that city, specifically Ch. Buehler. Both 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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"The Psychology and the Logic of the Lie" 
"The Psychology of Conscious Deception" 
"The Lies of Children and Youth" 
"ls It lver Necessary to Tell a Lie?" 
I" 
I 
f !,, 
I· 
! 
i· 
L 
•• 
------------------------c---~~--- -
4 
of these studies of course suffer from the decided lim-
itations inherent in any study based upon the statements, 
particularly the written statements, of children, limi-
tations of which students of the subject in hand, must be 
especially cognizant. The scientists responsible for these 
studies were mindful of these limitations but they believ-
ed, and possibly with some justification,that certain im-
portant features of the problem, such as the child's own 
attitude toward his lie, his motives for lying, could not 
be brought into relief in any other way as through the in-
trospective method. Both ins~d the children's objectiv-
ity of approach to the task as carefully as they could, and 
in addition endeavored to control the conditions as well as 
possible and to claim no more than the scope and method of 
such research would justify. It is quite possible that stud-
ies as significant as these have been made in our country. 
But if so, they hav~ not been made available as yet and what 
knowledge they have gained has not been shared to become the 
basis of fUrther progreee. 
~ ')\) '(, ~ 
The present discussion is not confined to the Ge~-:-
but their comparative richness and the fact that they have 
not been translated would seem to justify their preferent-
ial use • 
l 
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INTRODUCTION 
The good Saint Augustine believed that the young 
child is given to untruthfulness and deceit and that this 
fault disaPpears only in time, because "the grace of God 
leads man on the way of light to truth". Rousseau, on the 
other hand, believed that "the lies of children are the work 
of their educators". st. Augustine was probably much bias-
ed by his philosophy in the observation of childhood, and 
Rousseau, too, for that matter, by his predispostion to be-
lieve that man is inclined to spoil natur6's perfection. It 
must be admitted, that a good many other thinkers, if they 
did not follow the Apostle Paul in the conviction that "All 
men are liars" did believe that "all children are liars", as 
Lombroso and Perez, for example. 
~ mothers, puzzled by the untruths their children 
tell have taken comfort, however dubious>in this tradition-
al attitude, "all children are liars", deduc~ing, ~child 
is no exception in the problem he offers me." More dispas-
sionate students of child nature, scientific and otherwise, 
give a parent less ground for such comfort. Froebel main-
tains that any fault in human character may be traced ultim-
ately to some good trait; Compayre sees the child as sincer-(1) 
ity personified. Bertrand Russell asserts : "The child 
brought up without fear will be truthful, not in virtue of 
a moral effort, but because it will never occur to him to be 
Note(l) 
"Education and the Good Life" Ch. 8 
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!Btherwise." 
Perhaps both positions are overstatements. However, 
whether or not it is true that "all children ere liors" by 
nature or whether or not it is true that of hie own account 
a normal child is never untruthful, the problem of untruth-
6 
fulness in a child's expression is seemingly a universal one. 
Just what constitutes the problem in the lif,ht of modern child 
study, that is, what innate qualities may be factors either 
directly or indirectly, v1ha t influences in the _envd..ronment may 
be found determining one way or the other and in what degree, 
is a question the psychologist must endeavor to solve as 
basis for the work of the e~ucator. 
NOTE: The scope of the present study has been limited, 
perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, excluding the consideration of 
the pathological lie. As the bibliography indicates, German 
psycholosical literature has much to offer to this field of 
interest, warranting more extensive, separate supplemental 
study than the scop~ of the present report would justify. 
De. Henly's "Pathological I,ying, ~·ccusa tion end Swindling" 
is the outstanding contribution on this subject in the :?:nelish 
language. ihe cases reported on the whole rerresent adolescents 
rather than children, although, of course, they have implicati-
ons for the 2 tudent of children' e lies • 
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CHAPTER I 
WHAT I S A LIE 
To know how those who have thought of the lie as a 
problem in psychology have defined lie and truth will be 
helpfu1 in finding our specific problem in dealing with 
children's untruthfulnesses. 
Hall criticizes the popular definition of the lie as 
a "conscious departure from truth, spoken or acted when we (1) 
know better," because it precludes the artist's use of the 
imagination, the fabrication of ideals. Sully's definition 
would please him better: "A lie should connote an assertion 
made with fu11 consciousness of its untruth and in order to (Z) 
mislead. n William and Clara Stern define briefly: ".Lies 
are consciously false stat~nts, made with the purpose of 
( 3) 
deceiving others," 
'J 
Schroetter in his "Zur Psychologie und Logik der Luege" 
suggests tentatively that "Truth is where the expression 
corresponds to the total psychic state •••••••• we may speak 
of lie and deception where those expressions are laokin~ 
(4) 
Which correspond to the total psychic state." He immed-
iately amends this tentative definition, however, by ac•nowled~­
ing that a controlled strong emotion ought not derive anyone 
the de~ignation of liar and that the. many fine shadings 
from truth to lie must not be forgotten in the interest of 
Bote (1) "Educational Problems" Ch. 6 
'ote (2) "Studies of Childhood" Ch. ? 
Bote (3) "Erinnerung, Aussage und Luege" P. 33 
.Note (4) "Zur Psychologie und logik der Luege" P.3;? 
1 I 
' 
• 
• 
0 
(1) 
a simple fonnula. Sohroetter·' s further exposition 
makes clear the fact that he does not mean to single out 
the impetuous and impulsive expression of any affective 
state, the more or less pure and unalloyed expression of 
the "psychic situation", that is, the expression as such, 
as the only truthful expression. In analyzing the psychol-
ogy of judgments he disting11ishes between expression-judg-
ments (Ausdrucksurteile) and desire-judgments (T:~~~n:-ur­
teile). Since language contains so many social elements, 
there are not really any expressions as such. Independent 
prompting influences creep into even those expressions 
which serve us as emotional safety valves, \Vhen an audi..: 
ence is sought only for the sake of "psychic resonance". 
Such an independent element would be, for instance, the 
desire to be understood. Ho~ever, we can readily agree 
r 
with Schroetter that the desire-judgments are much more 
easily falsified and distorted than the expression-
judgments even when the desires, the promptings,are 
simply such as the desire to inform, or to explain. Ex-
pression-judgments are made for their own sake while the 
former are means to ends. The desires which are mo&~ like-
ly to cause falsification of judgment are primarily those of 
selfpreservation, and all those which could be subffUmed 
under the concept will-to-power, that is ambition, self-love 
unfUlfilled wishes. The latter are especially potent in the 
{1) op. cit. P• ~~ ff 
, 
• 
• 
case of a monotonous life. 
Of course not all judgments so motivated are subjectively 
false. They can become so only when there is an alternate-
judgment-possibilityC~rteilsmoeglichkeit) which contradicts 
the active tendency and if the alternate possibility is in-
vested with the subjective assurance of its truth. Until 
there is sufficient experience to give the prerequisite 
store of memory images there can be no judgment possibility. 
Until creative imagination has developed there can be no 
alternate judgment, no conflict, and therefore no lie, for 
memory images cannot contradict each other. 
The more or less unconscious assurance of truth arises 
out of a complex of experience in which evidence has been 
weighed, although largely, perhaps altogether, without 
conscious attention. The judgment possibility or possibili-
ties which are invested with this sense of validity, which 
Schroetter speaks of as the subjective assurance of truth, 
he designates as "correcting elements". They may make them-
selves felt in consciousness with varying degrees of inten-
sity. "It is a criterion of the lie that the correcting 
elements are present in consciousness", and thereby Schroet-
ter comes to his amended definition of the lie: "The lie 
consists of the effort to suppress the truth content and to 
~(1) 
replace or to distort it through a desire-judgment. This 
definition would include in the motives for the lie the des-
ire to appear interesting or exercise the imagination. 
Indeed Schroetter definitely exclUdes the intent to de~ 
Bote (1) Op. cit. P. 4b 
• 
• 
10 
ceive from his characterization of the lie. The intent 
to deceive is not a motive he says but merely a means to 
an end, and is besides a moral criterion rather than a 
psychological one. 
Schroetter accepts Duprat's idea that every liar is 
a person adept at suggestion but believes that autosuggest-
ion is exercised in much greater meagure than influence 
upon the consciousness of others. }"The liar is above all 
adept in autosuggestion. It is a part of his technique to 
rob the correcting elements of their intensity, indeed un-(1) 
der some circumstances to suppress them altogether." 
Schroetter is helpful in making clear that a lie is 
not possible without a store of experience. The mind con-
tent must be large enough to give material for the making 
of judgments and varied enough to make conflicts and con-
trasts possible. He is illuminating as far as he goes but 
he seems to let the individual appear somewhat passive 
while a battle between some mental images presumably issuing 
is gQi~~A in some predestined, very subjective en~is not suf-
ficient to see the lie as a conflict of Judgments. The act 
in which the conflict issues cannot be regarded otherwise 
than as part of the lie. Yore often than not this involves 
another person. Therefore Duprat's ~efinition fills a gap 
left in Sohroetter's: "The lie is a socio-psychologioal act 
of suggestion through which, by means of words or by some 
other method one person more or less intentionally endeav-
Bote(l) 
Translated from the German of Lowinsky, Op. cit. P.386 
• 
ors to create in the mind of another a positive or 
negative belief which does not correspond with that 
which seems truth to the doer." Prerequisites of the 
lie as a socio-psychological act would be the under-
standing of some relationship of the persons involved 
11 
to each other and to the end in view. In his disser-
tation on the psychology of conscious deception, Lowins-(1) 
ky devotes a chapter to the "development of the ability 
to make false stateents." He lists there four capacities 
involved in false statements, the last two of which indi-
cate some necessary complements to Schroetter's concept, 
{1) capacity to make Judgments, (2) discrimination between 
reality, imagination and memory, (3) certain interpersonal 
perceptions, emotions, judgments, acts, (4) capacity for 
expression. He thinks of the lie as a volitional act in-
volving knowledge of another person in eome determining 
way, and finding its impetus in some representation with ~ 
more or less strong affective tone(motive). 
Perhaps we may summarize that a lie involves conflict 
between SYme element in the mind content known to be true 
and some element known to be false, and the expression of 
the false as true with the purpose of influencing another 
person toward some end· • 
The "abilities to make false statements" comprise a 
somewhat formidable list: (1) the ability to make judg-
Note (1) Op. cit. Ch. 4 
• 
• 
mente, specifically comparative jUdgments, with an end in view, 
(2) the ability to recognize that which is valid as such in 
contrast to that which is false, (3) the" ~ersonality sense", 
or shall we call it the social senge, which sees the relatioh 
of persons to each other and to the end in question, and (5) 
the ca~acity for expression. 
On the other hand the weakness in a young child of 
what Schroetter calls n the correcting elements" in contrast 
with the strength of its promptings for self-determination 
may not be forgotten in our consideration. They would seem 
to be potent predisposing factors at least. 
To set a definite time for the possibility of the lie 
on the basis of our ~resent knowledge of the mental devel-
o~ment of children may not seem warranted , at least before 
science has made more studies of the expressions of children 
we have been wont to call lies. However, it is worth not-
ing Stern's comment following his analysis of a number of 
cases of untrue statements of young children: 
"The adult is too much ~redis~osed to project his 
own experience into the life of the child; and since so 
often he is deliberately lying when he says something not 
in harmony with reality, he makes the false analogy that 
the child who says something untrue is telling a lie • 
This evidences a regrettable lack of psychological in-
tuition, for, as we have seen •••••••••• among them~ 
seeming lies of the early years there are exceedinQy few 
6 
actual lies; by far the most of them, in the cases of the 
majority of children all of them , are attributable to 
much more elementary mental functions. We will not go so 
--------------------·-------------- -- --------~---- -----
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as ;ean_Paul, who mainta.imd, 'In the first five years 
our children say no tru.e word and no lying one, they 
simply talk'; but under favorable conditions we, too, 
would consider the end of the third year the earliest 
(1) 
normal possibility ( for conscious deception)." 
Op. cit. P. 144 
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C H A P T E R II, 
WHAT I S I N V 0 L y E D I H T E L L I N G 
THE : T R U T'H? 
In dealing with the lie from the viewpoint of 
psychology, the previous chapter by implication ap-
plied to truth the subjective criterion. Irrespect-
ive of other considerations, that was true to which 
adhered the subjective assurance of validity. That 
is, that was regarded as true whioh seemed true to 
the individual. One clue, however, to another aspect 
of truth was indicated in Lewinsky's finding that 
"discrimination between reality, imagination and mem-
ory" is a factor in the ability to make consciously false 
statements, respectivelY, consciously true statements. 
For successful living in the practical everyday world, 
truth may not be quite as relative as it appears to be 
when the subjective criterioh alone is applied. In a 
world of realities apprehended by countless individuals 
a common denominator of common findings has created an 
objective etanrtard. When the question is asked, "What 
is truth?" it is not fully answered if truth as object-
ive reality is not considered. We asked in the previous 
chapter wnat achievements a child must nave maue to be 
able to tell a lie. Can a young child tell the truth ob-
the jectively considered? Perhaps the shortest way to/answer 
is a consideration of the child's disabilities and pro~en­
sities which woUld cause him to make statements objective-
ly untrue. 
i 
I 
:I 
" I' 
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Lack of a Criterion of ObJectivity 
The child is in the process of learning to dis-
tinguish caprice, whim and fancy from reality, through 
15 
the many disagreements between his sense experiences and 
his imaginary experiences. The differentiation is not 
learned quickly, and in the meantime many of his imagin-
ary experiences are as vivid and real to him as his 
sense experiences. "The importance of the not-present 
is revealed to him with difficulty and very slowly ••••• 
even when thought is able to transcend short specific 
periods of time, he still lacks comprehension of the crit-
erion of objectivity: that everything which happens is a 
(1) 
consequence and has consequences." 
Errore of BDAQllecti~ 
Memory is short, often vague, subject to falsification 
by suggestion, imagination, the lack of comprehension of. 
time. 
"The comprehension of time is one of the child's 
most difficult and most slowly accomplished achievements. 
The child of four has a concept of the somewhat vague 
'long ago' and can make the rather broad differentiation 
of 'earlier' and 'later', but it is impossible for him 
to refer an experience to the definite 'day before yester-
day' or 'last week', even lese to any particular month • 
He can report with a certain degree of assurance that such 
and such a thing happened 'today' or 'not today', but he 
Note(l) Stern, Op. cit. p. 103 
I i 
, I 
I 
• 
will not be likely to refer a more distant experience 
definitely to 'yesterday'. Though a child may well 
remember what happened a year ago, a year as a meas-
ure of time will not be understood. In so far as a 
child is able to differentiate experiences chronolog-
ically, it will do this with the help of place desig-
nations: 'That was when we were in Berlin,' 'That was 
lb 
when we were home again,• ••••••• These are not merely (1) 
designations of places but vague designations of time." 
,Suggestibility 
A number of studies have been made to test the in-
fluence of suggestion upon expression, notable among 
(2) 
them "A Study of Suggestibility in Children" by K. A. 
Otis, and a series of "Beitraege z~ Psychologie-der (3) 
Aussage" published by William Stern in the interest of 
psychologists, jurists, historians and educators. These 
experiments and others made previously (Otis reviews the 
experiments of Binet, Gilbert, Giroud, and others) all 
lead the reader to the deduction that suggestibility is 
an influence upon expression for all ages. Otis finde 
that "we may fairly assume that the trait in question has 
been proved to exist," that "there is an appreciable fac-
tor unaccounted for by the influence of mental age, chron-
ological age and grade" but that of the factors studied 
Note (1) ibid. P. 29 
Note (2) Archives of Psychology 1924, No. 70. 
Note (3) Quotations from third paper in series, "Die 
Aussage ale geistige Leistung und ale Verhoereprodukt" 
pp. 1 and 7 
nmental age is the most important influence affecting 
resistance to suggestion.n Among the deductions she 
makes from the resUlt of her experiment with children 
are these: (l)nThe subject may show a tendency to ex-
perience a subjective sensation or perceptionn (as il-
lusion of warmth, odors, etc.) (2)nThe subject may show 
a tendency to form erroneous judgments through a 'con-
trolling idea'n, (3,!he subject may show a tendency to 
act in imitation or under the influence of another.n 
l ., 
In the experiment made under Stern's direction 40 sohool 
children, ranging in.age from 7 to 14, were give~ individual 
copies of the colored picture of a peasant room containing 
a number of familiar objects for one minute's careful obser-
vation. Immediately afterward each child was asked for a 
spontaneous description, and was then questioned according 
to a list of questions covering the important items and in-
cluding a few suggestive questions concerning objects not 
included. Only about six percent of the statements in the 
spontaneous description were incorrect, but 33 percent of 
all statements made in answer to questions including one 
half of all answers to suggestive questions were wrong, 
ranging from 51 percent among the youngest to 18 percent 
among the oldest of the subjects. In another group, this 
consisting of 4? pupils ranging in age from ? to 18, a 
total of 131 different objects not seen in the picture 
• ,, " 
was il1usioncd into their memories of it innnediately af-
ter the inspection of the picture on the basis of the 
• ~t~rn'e n~nression: hine1ni1Jusioni~rt 
: lr ll 
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questions asked. The outstanding deduction from this 
series of Aussage experiments made under the leadership 
lo 
of Stern seems to be that there is a "remarlably not-
iceable and long persisting increase in resistance against 
suggestion" correlated with the chronological age, which 
means to say, in other words, that the resistance in young 
children is very small. His study of "Suggestibility of (1) 
Children" leads Small to the conclusion that iuggestibil-
ity in healthy children is (1) a universal condition, (2) 
high in degree, (}) largely within in the control of anyone 
who knows the child mind. Suggestion clearly adds "judg-
ment possibilities", to use Schroetter's term, to the child'~ 
mind content, affects decrease of the field of attention 
through the suggesting influence, and so focuses attention 
upon the foreign, injected material. That many statements 
result which, though subjectively true are objectively un-
true is inevitable. 
What the Germans call "Funktionslust", that is a 
great urge to the playful, otherwise purposeless, exercise 
of any capacity, is particularly strohg in the child and 
causes him to make statements which are objectively untrue. 
As a rule, these could not be classified among those sub-
jectively true. They would be neutral, that is, character-
ized by an absolute indifference to the meaning of the ut-
terance. "It happens that thought is suppressed by speech. 
Note (1' :Pedagogical Seminary., 1896·, l'/6-220 
;~· 
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Often there is no representation, no thought, only speech ••• 
talk just to be talking ••••• The child, so recently come in-
to control of the organa· of speech, uses these :tor play pur-
poses. He talks because it gives him pleasure to talk • 
And Jean Paul seems to conclude that because of this fact 
the criteria of truth and untruth may not be applied to the (1) 
utterances of children." The pleasure in self expression 
leads to confabulations for the sake of the pleasure the 
play of fancy gives. Bchroetter reminds of the child's 
tendency to play with imagery in total obliviousness to 
reality, and to perceive and interpret all new experience 
in the light of hie fantasies. He plays with hie fantasies 
as he plays with language, "as he plays with everything. 
Children can do this because the meaning of language is no 
(2) 
more clear to them than is anything else." It would be 
difficult to distinguish many times whether a child's ut-
terance- receives i te imp_etue from the desire to exercise 
the imagination or the desire to play with the newly acquir-
ed language. Whether it is either or both, the activity 
represents a stage of development which clearly preclude~the 
application of the standards of objective truth to the state~ 
mente made. 
In the early joy of finding language a medium :tor the 
(3) 
realization of his wishes, the child~ according to Lewinsky 
·Note (1) Schroetter,_ opus cit. p, 36 
Note (2) ibid. p, 6, 
Note (3) Lowinsky, op. cit. p. 440 
--1 
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• 
is inclined to set words in the place of experience. 
He may recognize the reality of any experience, but as-
cribe to language the power to change it, or rather to 
,u 
act as substitute. So the denial of a naughtiness or of 
any unpleasant happening m~ not be anything but the en-
deavor to put in place of it that which the child's state-
ment of it expresses. "This magic potency not only the 
budding intellect ascribes to its own speech; the naive 
man evidences his belief in it when he attempts cures 
through incantations, curses his enemies, knows the number 
(.1) 
of prayers which will impose his Will upon his God's. 
Limited Vocabulary 
During the process of language acquisition the vocab~ 
ulary is often not adequate for a desired expression and so 
it can happen that a child's symbol for·eomethingthat is 
true to him appears as a misstatement. A child's utterances~ 
while in forms attained to in a more or less accidental 
manner and while they ·are a specifically individual achieve-
ments, do not express what is obJectively true to those to 
whom only the commonly accepted language expressions are 
known. To him one word may have many meanings and take the 
place of whole sentences. therefore, if capacity for expres-
sion was listed as an achievement necessary before a lie 
could be told, it is an achievement necessary also before 
utterances can be made that attain to obvious standards of 
objective truth.~Before a child's statements can express 
(1) ibid, p. 440 
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reality consistently he must have attained to experience 
and abilities which overcome progressively (1) lack of 
differentiation between recalled, imaginary and immediate 
experience, (2) lack of understanding of the continuity 
in process and time, (}) predisposition to influence by 
suggestion, (4) limitation of vocabulary and misunder-
standing of the fUnction of language. The exercise of 
his nFunktions-lustn will later take developed forms, as 
in literary, dramatic and other esthetic expressions, which 
represent objective truth metaphorically • Pleasure in 
expression A! something then takes the place of pleasure 
in expression as such. 
Since the achievements mentioned above are realized 
only and commonly in the course of a child's natural dev-
elppment it must be that before their realization the ex-
pectation of statements always objectively true is unjust-
ified. The pre-requisite of the conscious intentional de-
ception used as a means in the service of a desire, which 
is a lie, is also a certain amount of learning and devel-
opment, as suggested in the last chapter. Therefore the 
deduction would seem inevitable,that since both lying and 
truth-telling must be learned, ~~ !tatementa occur in the 
meantime which are neither lie nor truth. There will be 
many utterances which are objectively untrue while they are 
subjectively true, that is, they will represent the child's 
concept of reality which is, however, under the circumstan-
ces a mistaken concept, and there will probably be ~ny 
which represent nuances between. 
• 
• 
C H A P T E R III 
UNCONSCIOUSLY UNTRUE 
STATEMENTS 
Some of the unconsciously untrue statements child-
ren make may find a ready diagnosis in one of the pro-
pensities or disabilities discussed in the last chapter. 
Most of them have more complex causes in varied combinations 
of these, with the possible addition of others not discern-
ed. This chapter will report illustrative cases of child-
ren's untruths, classified according to the cause which 
seems most outstanding in each case. 
Limitations of Language as a Factor 
( 1) 
The Sterns make report of several cases from their 
records in which the statements clearly do not mean what 
the language used makes them seem to indicate. Suggest-
ive questions called forth from the child "an affective · 
word-reaction Which took.on the semblance of a statement 
of fact ••••••••• If anything is said to the child that is 
disturbing to him, he uses his words of defense regardless 
of the time implications of the remark. If the reference is 
to the present or the ~ast rather than the future, his de-
fense takes on the semblance of a lie. The following inci-
dent illustrates such a defense against a distressing re-
minder: In connection with demonstrations of affection, 
the two and a half year old child pinched her little broth-
er so that he gave a startled cry. Her mother scolded 
(1} o~. cit. p.35 
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H.; and when she later said, 'And what did H. do to 
Baby Brother?t She hurt himt' The child retorted with 
a 'No, no!', evidently unhappy in the recollection. 
Her facial expression, too, bore witness to the distress 
the reminder caused. The 'No, no' was not denial but 
the defensive wish 'Please, don't talk about it any more.'" 
Stern cites another case~ similarly interpreted, this 
issuing in a.wishful "yes" whicr might have been thought 
to be an asserting "yes": "Today we took H. {age 3;0) to 
a hill commanding a distant view. We called her attention 
to many things, as 'See there, the tower,--there the chim-
ney with the smoke coming out of it,' etc. H. always en-
deavored to see the thing pointed out; and in answer to our 
questions, 'Do you see it?' always said 'yes', but some-
times it was noticeable that the 'yes' was not correspond-
~ ing toAfact~ that she was not seeing. We tried a suggest-
ive question about a flying bird not at all in evidence, 
and again followed the 'yes'. When we urged, 'you are not 
seeing it and when you do not see it you must say "no"', 
she would answer 'no', listening earnestly to the repeated 
question; however in the next moment there was again a 
'yes' upon a similar occasion. This was not a lie~ H. 
had not the least interest in hoodwinking her parents; it 
was only that in her eagerness and her curiosity she would 
have been so glad to see the rider, the bird, et. This 
wish to comply With our intentions found its expression 
in the 'yes'. It was not an asserting 'Yes, I see it' but 
---,------------=======--========------__:_, 
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an expectant, wishful, 'Yes, I would like so much to see {1) . 
it.'" 
Everyday experience with young children as well the 
literature of child study offers many examples of suppos-
ed pretense of Pain or of desire to void excretions. At 
first the expression is associated with the experience, 
later with both the real experience and the results in 
atention, which resulted. "The result takes the foreground 
in the association and the literal sense of the expression 
may be forgotten altogether. Ament reports the case of a 
little girl aged 1:9, who·~ suffering from chickenpox, ans-
wered every painful touch with 'we-we' (Weh meaning 'hurt') 
and was thereupon left in Peace. Later, as a result, she 
impatiently used the expression 'no, we-we' when she did 
not want to be disturbed in her absorbing play. This 'we-
we' was symbolical, did not intend to give a reason for the 
defensive attitude, it merely expressed that attitude, 
(2) 
nothing more." 
Lowinsky also speaks of those expressions of the child 
which to the child serve several purposes and which cause 
the adult to feel deceived if he has not been able to dis-
24. 
(3 
tinguish the one which is in the foreground for the child. 
His examples of language used by the child as magic are not 
altogether convincing and seem to force the point somewhat • 
(1) op. cit. p. 36 (2) quoted by Stern, p. 110 from Ament, Die Entwicklung 
from Sprechen und Denken beim Kinde, P• 82 (3) op. cit. p. 45 
-• 
•• 
The possibility of such use of language (as set forth in 
the previous chapter) is very plausible and future obser-
vations, carefully noting tone and gesture as well as ver-
bal expression may substantiate this interpretation of 
many seemingly deceitful, or obviously untrue utterances 
of children. 
Confabulations 
Of confabulations, indulged in by children with the 
consciousness of their fabrication, in the playful exer-
cise of the imagination, literature records many. One 
example may suffice, chosen again a~era from Stern as one 
stenographically recorded:nE•s mother was on the point of 
telling her a fairy story (};5) when E. began ahead of her: 
'Bhal1 I tell y~ a story about a little baby? The little 
baby picked a hole, with an umbrella it picked the hole. 
When she opened it she picked the hole. She picked it 
right in her head. Then I hurried right out and got a stick-
ing plaster. Father gave me a big piece of sticking plaster 
and I tore it in two, {You know, my name is lfother, she ad-
ded in explanation)--and I licked it and then I pasted it on 
its head; and when it came off I pasted a new one on it. (1) 
But the little Baby cried.•n 
Blending of the Real and the Imagined 
Child literature abounds in examPles of the very char-
acteristic blending of the immediate and the imagined ex-(2) 
perience in the accounts given by children. Sully quotes 
one, which, though it represents an adult's reminiscence is 
(1) op. cit. p. 105 ( 2) Studies of Childhood, p. 25'1 
-probably characteristic: "A little American girl, sent 
into the oak shrubbery to get a leaf, saw a snake, which 
eo frightened her that she ran home without the leaf. 
As cruel fate would have it, she met her brothers and told 
them she had seen a 'eauger'. 'They knew,' writes the lady, 
who recalls this reminiscence of her childhood, the differ-
ence between snakes and their habits, and, boylike, wanted 
red 
to tease me and said "T'was no sauger,-it didn't have a/ring 
around its neck now, did it?" My heated imagination saw 
Just such a serpent as soon as their words were spoken, and 
I declared it had a ring about ita neck.' In this way she 
was led on to say that it had scars, and a little bell on 
its neck, and was soundly rated by her brothers a.s 'a liar'~' (1) 
An interesting example from Stern,exactly recorded at 
the time, portrays a child of four years and three months 
in an experience in which the imagined element was patently 
real: 
"In the process of looking at an animal picture book, 
H. asked her mother wh~ther she might stroke this or that 
animal. This was for her the measure of the wildness or 
tameness of the animal in question. In the case of one of 
the bears, her mother gave her that platonic permission. 
Then H. began to relate:'Do you know, once when I went to 
the Zoological Garden with Dolly we stroked the ice-bear, 
and the brown bear and the black bear.' Since the activ-
(1) op. cit. p. 37 
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ity engaged in was a lesson in observation, her mother 
endeavored to lead H. back into reality by suggesting 
that one must not stroke those because they are wild an-
imals. H. remonstrated vehemently, and in the excitement 
of the occasion she tore herself with a pin. Her mother 
quickly ran to get a sticking plaster; and when she return-
ed, H. was still crying with the pain. In spite of this 
she had to give vent to her feelings of outraged Justice, 
and insisted, with big tears in her eyes and with sobbing 
voice, 'But Dolly and I Aid stroke the ice-bear and the 
. brown bearl' Calming her, the understanding mother said, 
'Yes, yes, you stroked them.'" (1) 
Karl Groos reports of a three and a half year old 
boy that he was "strong in extravagances". In "Nordberlin" 
he claimed to have seen a fish that looked like a shark 
and had feet with boots on them. Once.he reported, "In 
Nordberlin there are rabbits and dogs on the roof. They 
climb up on a little ladder and then they play 'round with 
each other ••••• and then.~ •• and then there comes a tele-
phone, you know, a long rope, and then they go on that to 
Stuttgart." 
Falsifications of Recollection 
' Because of their exhaustive studies of and notations 
on the recollections of their children, the examples from ( 2) 
Stern are valuable: "Sooetimes errors ·.in recollection may 
( 1) The Play of lJan, p. 189 (quoted in Stern p. 10 '/) (2) Stern op. oit. ch. ; 
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be traced to the falsifying effect of great interest, 
for example the mother's following report:'One Febru-
ary day, while taking a walk to the park with H. (3;10), 
we conversed much about the swans living in the lake 
there, and we were both very curious to learn whether we 
would see them. There were none to be seen, however, since 
the lake was still covered with ice. We discussed the 
possibility of their being inside the little swanhouse in 
the water, and the probable appearance of the house inside. 
Then we talked about various other things, as we started 
homeward again. In the course of the walk home, I asked H. 
'What will you tell Father when we get home?' She anewered 
promptly: 'That we saw the swans.' I:'What did we see?' 
H.: .'Many swans.' I: 'Did we really see swans?' H., think-
ing: 'No, they were in the little house.' And with what 
assurance had she first testified to seeing the swanst 
This must prove that the content of a strong interest may 
seem like that Of a real experience, even though sense per-
ception be lacking. 
nnabitual associations may cloud an isolated perception~ 
'We gave H.(3;10) a picture in black and white, portraying 
two eagles falling upon a gull. H. examined it briefly but 
with interest and her mother explained it to her. Two hours 
later we asked her what she had seen in the picture and she 
described it correctly. A question intended to lead her 
astray('Were not the eagles down on the ground?') had no ef-
fect. However, questions concerning the color of the sky 
were answered with 'blue', and of the eagle with 'brown'. 
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Even after repeated injunctions to 'think again' she in-
sisted on 'blue' and 'brown'. 
"Much later, at the age of six years and one half 
month, we took note of a decided error in the recollection 
of size. H. had been given a toy rabbit for Easter, which 
her mother took in custody. After twenty four hours she re-
turned it to the child. H. insisted it was not her rabbit, 
that hers had been much larger, and she wanted her own. Her 
mother had no other, and tried to·pursuade her quietly of 
that fact, but the child was not quite convinced. She asseri-
ed and reasserted that her rabbit had really been larger. 
The error may have been due, in part, to the fact that H. 
had seen many large rabbits in the show windows at Easter 
time, and in part to her memory of a rabbit twice as large 
which she had received the Easter previous. She remembered 
the previous rabbit vividly and its image may have blended 
with that of the new one." 
Influence of Suggestion 
The influence of suggestion was eo apparent in a 
number of the examples of children's untrutmpreviously 
cited under other categories, that a separate list of ex-
amples is not necessary. Very often, when not a primary 
cause, it is a strongly contributing one. That children 
tell untruths under the influence of the questions of 
adults was evident to one Christian Saltzman who back in 
1807 wrote what he called his "Book of Directions for the (1) 
Unintelligent Training of Children". He gives the fol-
(1) Translated title. 
~~~--~~ ~-- - ----
lowing example of an inquisition sure to bring unre-
liable answers from children: 
"'Did you see little Caroline's mother?-' 
'Yes, she was there.• 
'What did she wear?' 
'I did not notice.• 
'Oh, you must have noticed. Did she wear a. 
calico or a linen dress?' 
'I think calico.• 
'What a foolish girl you are. I think calicot 
Don't you know for certain?' 
'Yes, now I remember,----it was calico.'" (1) 
Similarly, Stern speaks of the falsifying effect 
of the adult's demand for exactness uPOn a child's deeig-
_.;,U 
nations of time: n . Spontaneous recollections offer no dif-
ficulty in this respect, but the questions of grownups us-
ually demand a definite designation of time. We do not 
want to know whether the child at ~ time during a walk 
met hie playmate F., but whether he met him today, not 
whether he sometime brushed his teeth but whether he did it 
this morn1ng, etc. In early childhood such guileless ques-
tions must stir up a very rat's nest of altogether naive 
errors in recollection. The child will answer 'yes' be-
cause the question has called forth the vivid image of the 
playmate or of tooth-brushing and the specification 'today' 
was not grasped. And as for the question 'when?!- if it 
meets with any understanding at all will do so through sug-
gestion and is likely to be answered at random. It is 
therefore evident that in such cases, as in many others, 
the adult questioner bears the fault of the untrue state-
mente." 
(1) op. cit. P• 29 
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C H A P T E R IV 
TRUTH-TELLIUG AS AN ACHIEVEMENT 
With the child's growth and mental development, 
the "subjective assurance of truth" (Ch. I) necessarily 
emerges more and more definitely as an attribute of the 
..,, 
true "judgment possibilities". Through his progressive 
experience also the subjective assurance of truth comes 
to correspond more and more with that which is objectively 
true. The child learns to make a conscious distinction 
between the true and the false. The assumption seems in 
order thnt under normal conditions the expression of the 
t~ is the normal natural result. There is not suffi-
cient authentic material in the literature of child study 
to prove or disprove this assumption. The notations of 
the Stern's may be taken to serve as proof of its possi-
bility if not probability in a favorable environment, 
where truth-telling by adults is taken for granted and 
where the necessary stress of adjustment is met with un-
derstanding thoughtfulness. (see ~h. V). The following 
translation from Stern (1) represents typical notations 
and quotations from his book tracing truth-telling as 
an achievement: 
"To get a correct picture of a child's attitude 
to truth and falsehood it is necessary to study also 
spontaneous truthfulness. Under normal conditions the 
little child gives expression to all subjective experi-
ence and it is much more natural for him to tell in a 
naively frank way all that concerns him than to keep it 
to himself or to distort it. This frankness extends over 
(1) op. cit. pp. 121-124 
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little misdeeds, unless undue strictness on the part of 
educators has destroyed natural mutual trust ••• Preyer 
tells of his son that 'the least wrong, the most unim-
portant transgression, was reported by the child with 
a peculiar naive earnestness•. Similarly, the Scupins ( 1 ) 
report : •our boy reports his little sins with a naive 
frankness. For instance, when we enter the room 
the little voice i~eard in somewhat distressed tone (2:7): 
•Bubi took some sugar• , or, ~Tore the paper again!• 
Punishment in the face of such frank confession is, of 
course, more than mild.' •••••••••.••.••.•• A somewhat 
higher development is indicated by an occurrence we noted 
in our daughter Eva at 2:b 'We showed Eva some flowers 
picked by her little brother. Therenpon Eva (who always 
likes to do or to have done what brother and sister do 
and have done): n1 picked •••••• ! sometimes pick some 
too!" She came to herself in the middle of the sentence 
and exercised self-correction to tell the truth. There-
fore she had even then an understanding of the fact that 
without the qualification the statement would not have been 
trti.e • ' .••••.••.•..•..•...•.•...•......•................• 
A little later this frankness may become a moral quality, 
at times even a decided over-conscientiousness. This is 
within the scope of the normal, while it is the result, 
of the first, not yet clear, insight into the ugliness of 
falsehood ••••• We noted some temporary overconscientious-
ness after the fifth year. Guenter supplied several 
typical examples (.5:4). His oother reports: ' G. is 
( 1 ) op. cit. p. 1~6 
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at present so strict with himself that he often appends 
his statements with "I think so anyway!r. ••••• The concept 
of falsehood, lie, is not yet quite clear to him ••• He has 
not yet limited it properly but extended it too far, but 
he seems to be in the midst of the achievement of the cor-
rect idea. In earlier years, when occasion seemed to demand,. 
I would admonish, "One must always tell a thing the way it 
really is". He concluded: Anything told which is not, or 
not any longer in harmony With reality, is falsehood. The 
other evening he called to me from the darkened room:"Mother 
do come a minute. I want to tell you something. You know, 
when I was in Berlin I told Aunt w. that I want to be an 
Uncle Doctor. But now I don·' t want to be one, and now 
that is a lie, isn't it7" I rea~sured him and explained 
he had not told a lie because at the time he really intended 
to be a doctor and had only decided othe~vise afterward, 
but promised that I would write Aunt w. that he did not 
want to be a doctor.' 
The notations show that at the age of 6:0 the concept 
of the lie is clear to the boy and that he tells the truth 
without exaggerated attention to it as truth. In the cases 
of his two sisters the notations show no phase of over-
conscientiousness while the concepts of lie and·truth are 
being made clear but all of them seemed to have attained 
to consistent truth telling as a n11 t1.1ral normal thing. 
H. at the age of 7:2 mskes it a point to tell the 
teacher whenever she has received help at home with her 
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lessons but at the same time she can enter with evident 
enjoyme~t into the little teasing prevnrications of the ( 1 ) 
home. The statements of the three children, always 
carefully recorded v:hen they had any bearing on the 
problem, never included an actual lie. The nearest 
approach were such "pseudo lies" as are recorded in~he 
following chapter. 
(1) op cit. pp. 34 and 124. 
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CHAPTER V 
PSEUDO LIES 
The prerequisites of the lie discussed in Chapter 
I were largely of representative nature, and it was limi-
tations in the child's representative capacities which 
were found to be the cause of necessarily many unconscious-
ly untrue statements (Ch.IIl: The examples of untruth cited 
were, on the whole, what Stern calls "disinterested un-
truths", and they were subjectively true or neutral, that is 7 
indifferent to trnth. We suggested in the discussion of the 
lie (Ch.I) :"The weakness in a young child of what Schroet-
ter calls 'the correcting elements• in contrast to the 
stre~h of its Promptings for self-determination would con-r. 
stitute potent predisposing factors to lying." It cannot be 
denied that before mental capacities are sufficiently dev-
eloped to make possible the lie as characterized in Chapter 
I, there are many utterances which could not quite have 
"subjective assurance of validity" to the child and which 
seem to serve some interest. Stern speaks of these as "in-(1) 
terested untruths". His exposition of this subject is so 
illuminating that several Paragraphs from his chapter on the 
subject should be quoted: 
"These interested untruths, which are observable in the 
lives of all little children, are not necessarily lies, but 
they represent the transition from unintentional to inten-
tional untruths, or lies. It depends upon outer and inner 
(1) op. cit. ch. 10 
influences, upon innate tendencies and upon training 
whether these potential lies shall be nipped in the bud 
or developed." He calls attention to a contrast be-
tween the two classes of untruths under discussion: 
"Whereas the first mentioned class of untruths is very 
preponderantly of positive content (they represent some-
thing as real which is not real), the latter consist al-
most whollY of negations. Many, the most harmless, remain 
negations, of parrying, disavowal, denial. Others grow 
from negations into positive untruths, as blaming of others, 
quibbling, casuistries. 
"!f the purely defensive untruth is not properly called 
a lie, it is on the borderland of a sphere which o~fers 
many psychological and pedagogical difficulties. Even the 
child of three to five years old still has1fhe tendency, in 
situations the consequences of which he fears, to ward off 
the unpleasant, and as a rule, like the younger child, with 
words of denial. The child WIItlt of more developed intelli-
gence, however, will follow this primary reaction with a 
correction and Will realize more or less distinctly the 
variance oX his words with truth ••••• The adult experiences 
an analogous process but is able to overcome subjectively 
the first phase, the wish to deny. Not so with the undevel-
oped human being. He proJects externally what occurs in-
ternally and only after he has worked off his defense in 
this way~ is he amenable to correction or aelf correction. 
It is in the hands of the educator to let this tendency to 
immediate retraction come to fruitage or to nip it in the 
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bud and eo abet the resulting lie of fear." 
The following examples from a number cited by 
Stern illustrate these untruths, Which might be called 
pseudo-lies: "The mother reports of G.(3:4t):' I noticed 
that a bit of wall paper was hanging torn from the wall; 
some chairs in front were Placed in a manner habitual 
with G. in hie Play; therefore there could be no doubt he 
was the culprit. I asked H. and G.:"Who tore off that 
piece of wall paper?" H. answered in confident tone, 
"Not I". G. kept his face turned away and also answered 
"Not I". I quietly requested of him: "Come to me." G. 
put his hands behind him: "But don't hit me." This was 
really an acknowledgment, since he had never received a 
slap he did not richly deserve. I:"No, I won't punish 
you. Now come, my boy. Look here, did you tear this off?" 
G.:"Yee." I took the opportunity to explain to him that 
good children always tell the truth immediately. The fear 
of a punishment though not severe, had_at first impelled 
G. to the denials "Not I" and "But don't hit me", but 
when he noticed that there was nothing to fear the quiet 
correct statement took the place of the denial." 
"G. behaved in a similar way three months later, 
when he had etewn little bite of pastcbo~rd about the 
room. The mother, entering, aeked:'Who did that?' and G. 
\ 
and H. answered 'I didn't.' The mother quietly repeated 
her question and~. said, 'I did~. In this case self correc-
• 
tion occurred without the necessity of a preliminary assur-
ance that there would be no punishment." 
I 
l: 
nEven in his fifth year we find occasional, though 
very occasional examples of such momentary attempts at 
denial, but this denial is always abandoned after the 
first reminding question. In all this time it never came 
to an accomplished lie and in his sixth year, he evidenced, 
on the contrary an over-conscientiousness in regard to 
truth telling.n (1) 
A notation from the notebook of the Scupins is very 
illuminating in this connection: nThe boy (2;11~) brought 
a piece of mortar today explaining in a manner half teas-
ing and half shy that he had broken it from the balcony. 
Then, when he sUddenly noticed stern expressions on our 
faces, he quickly corrected: '~o, no; the little bird broke 
it off!' When his parents asked him kindly, nWhat is the 
name of the naughty little bird who did it?' he studies 
our facial expressions for a while; and when he could see 
nothing more of anger or strictness, he said, with an em-
b~assed little shrug, 'It was Bubi anyway!' Stern calls 
attention to the fact that the boy told of his misdeed 
spontaneously at first without any embarrassment, used his 
means of defence when he saw danger symptoms but dropped 
them immediately when he found his parents kind, and he con-
cludes "In children so young, who must still atain to firm-
ness of character, it is necessary above all things that the 
overcoming of the tendency to denial is made easy. It is 
not to be expected at this early age that a child achieve 
(l~ The diary of a young child's development much quoted 
in German literature of child study as also by Stern op. cit. 
p. 114 
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conquest of self without help." In Schroetter's terms 
this would mean that the "correcting elements" need 
strengthening through attention. Lowinsky thinks it 
safe to assume that the young ch~d under four, making 
his difficult adjustments to an environment which does 
not understand many of his strivings, is in greater temp-
tation to prevarication than ever after, that this danger 
(1) 
becomes progressively less as this adjustment is effected. 
" With understanding help at the time pseudo lies disappear 
into frank sincerity. In an environment in which adjust-
ment is too difficult they pave the way to actual lies. 
(1) op. cit. p. 448 
C· 
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C H A P T E R VI 
ACTUAL LIES 
The foregoing chapter would seem to cast some doubt 
upon the traditional assumption that a propensity for ly-
ing needs to be taken for granted in the lives of children. 
Whether or not the problem.of children's lies is an inevit-
able one in the education of children, it seems to be a prev-
alent one in many families. The motives for the deliberate 
falsification of truth on the part of children are the crux 
of the problem. They were the subject of several fruitful 
investigations by European psychologists, {see Preface) 
dealing in all With 784 school children •. 
Investigation by Baumgarten 
The study of "Lies of Children and Youth" by Dr. Fran-
ziska Baumgarten, {see Preface, p. 2) was made in seven Pol-
ish boys and girls schools of six or seven classes (grades) 
each, two primary schools for poor girls and one class of 
.. 
nine young women, aged 16 to 20 of1\Froebel Training School. 
The psychological interpretation of the resulting material 
is not statistical but is based on the quotation of numer-
ous examples in illustration of the various points under con· 
sideration. The complexity of the material seemed to make 
this method advisable and necessary. The author catalogues 
the short comings of the questionaire method, quotes William 
Stern and others as discounting all results so obtained, 
but believes that the development of an inquiry teohnif.Ue 
-------~-----------
C· 
't 
is necessary ~or the study of numerous psychic states 
• 
in childhood, and that therefore her method o~ a~proach 
is justified. The investigator had set it as her aim 
to learn something of an answer to the questions, What 
are the motives of children's lies, and, What is the atti-
• tude of children to their lies~ I set up for eight to ten 
year old children some questions bearing on these two 
problems. The answers to a test use of these questions in 
one class showed that they were not well stated. One of 
them read, Why have you lied? Most of the children did 
not answer this question, but motives were always a~par­
ent in the description of examples of lies given. I de-
cided that it was sufficient to ask for an example. Be-
cause I repeatedly read the comment, "That was my first 
lie", I made the deduction that the first lie often makes 
a deep impression upon the child's memory, and included 
the question, Do you remember your first lie? Another 
spontaneous comment of the children, "I was ashamed of my 
lie but I have not been sorry for it" caused me to dis-
~inguish between shame and regret in my questions. After a 
series of tests and revisions I determined upon a list of 
questions all of which were answered fully by all the 
pupils of the first class (Note:This seems to correspond 
to our 7th grade). I let tuis result serve as a criterion 
of the justification of these questions and gave them with-
out change to eight year old children as well as 18-yr. 
old youth. This was the final wording of the questions: 
1. Have you ever told a lie at home? 
2. Have you ever told a lie at school7 
3. Give examples of your lies. 
4. Were you ashamed of your lie? 
5. Have you regretted your lies? 
6. Do you remember your first lie? (Note: Translation causes some change in connotation, 
though slight. 
The composition of the questions I found to be a negligible 
piece of work in comparison to the securing of the material. 
In order to draw from children the greatest number of ex-
amples one must know how to talk to children, to win their 
confidence, to arouse their interest, in the subject at 
hand. Only if the psychologist succeeds in arousing the 
confidence of children, be it ever so rudimentary, can he 
hope to secure sincere answers to questions as searching as 
such which demand a confession of untruthfulness." The in-
vestigator conducted her inquiry in the schoolrooms in the 
absence of the class teacher. She was introduced by the 
principal, the children were directed by him in supplying 
themselves with a sheet of white paper, age written in at 
the top. After telling the pupils that the next hour would 
be used for a chat, a tete-a-tete with the visitor, he de-
parted. The children are reported to have shown great 
pleasure in the freedom sugrested by this announcement. Un-
constrained in the absence of all school officials they ask-
ed lauehingly, What is it going to be about? Announcement 
was mnde, without indication of the nat11re of the task, 
•·· 
that they would be asked for some written answers to a net 
of questions. It was emphasized that no one but the visi-
tor, not the teacher, nor the principal, would see the 
answers. The sincerity of the answers was further guaran-
teed by the reminder that surnames need not be recorded, 
that the visitor was not acquainted with the individuals 
nor with their handwriting. The announcement of the topic 
was always followed by a time of noticeable embarrassment. 
"The pupils in the third class of one school even laid down 
their pens and declared unanimously that they would not com-
ply. Only my assurance that all the pupils in the higher 
as well as the lower classes of all the Polish schools in 
the town had answered _these questione, could quiet them and 
induce them to write." Very co~only, in all grades, re-
assurance was desired that teacher or principal, perhaps 
teacher of religion, would not see the papers. Blotters 
were used to hide the writing from the indiscretions of 
neighboring pupils. It happened repeatedly that the invest-
igator was asked to turn her faae to the wall when papers 
were laid on the desk, eo that, the children said, she 
would not know by the order placed who the authors might 
be. l~y inquiries concerning the purpose of this kind of 
written lesson were made, always answered by the inform-
ation that it was for a scientific purpose, an answer under-
stood only by the older children,of course. The leader's 
assurance that she herself had lied more than once in her 
life was particularly effective in arousing interest in the 
'I 
I 
answers desired. Several obstre~erous children were seen 
to take the pen and begin as a result. The investigator's 
effort to make it very clear that no one was urged to write 
who did not want to, since the visitor did not desire that 
children should lie in telling about lies, but that she 
desired very much to have detailed answers, tranquillized 
the groups noticeably. nAfter this remark one ten year old 
boy rose to say very resolutely that only bad boys would 
have much to write since good boys did not tell lies. Of 
course, this called for the explanation that it was bad 
boys who did not write much because they endeavored to keep 
their deeds secret, that good boys, on the contrary, are 
sincere, and would be glad to tell frankly the small trans-
gressions of which even the best are guilty.n Dr. B. be-
lieves that these and similar reactions make evident that 
the children probably withheld as much as they told, and 
she assumes that the real conditions are considerably less 
favorable than the answers of the children would imply. The 
author confesses that at first she had grave doubts in re-
gard to the degree of sincerity exercised in the work of the 
children, but these doubts were die~elled in the reading of 
the results. nproofs that both children and young people 
took their tasks quite seriously were very general. Even 
in the primary classes the ~upils tried to learn the nature 
of the demand very exactly. There were many questions such 
as, nnoes that mean I have told a lie when I have told my 
brother that I would give him some pictures, but did not 
give them to him because I forgot about it? 'Is nn April 
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fool a lie?' 'I threatened my little brother that I 
would call the Policeman if he did not stop crying, but 
though he did not stop I did not call the policeman. Was 
that a lie?' Sincerity is sometimes attested by detailed 
description of family conditions, and very commonly by 
reference to teachers, and relatives, who were the victims 
of the lies described. Dr. B. regards suggestion as a fac-
tor but believes that in view of the freedom not to answer 
at all, the encouragement given to write and the example of 
others writing did not constitute sufficient suggestion to 
cause untrue answers. All classes in the· same districts 
were tested on the same day. Pupils in the same school 
who had answered the inquiry were dismissed into a recre-
ation room and thus separated from those who had not yet 
written. Although every precaution was taken to avoid 
communication between pupils who had and those who had not 
answered the questions several occurences ns the following 
indicate that not all intercommunication was avoided: nin 
one boys' school a little mite of the first class received 
my announcement of the theme of the inquiry with an en-
thusiastic '0, then you ought to go to V~s. w.•s schooll 
My sister goes there, and~ can lie~'n Dr. B. believes 
that such cases are not sufficiently numerous to be any-
thing but a very negligible proportion in a total of over 
a thousand examples. nThe value or my inquiry must be 
judged by the cited examples. I am quoting the answers 
in extenso, retaining their style and orthography exactly.n 
(Note: These were lost, of course, in the double trans-
'I ·•· I 
' i 
lation.} A total of 1078 examples of lies were furnished 
by 553 children. Only 18 of these children answered that 
they do not lie and 5 professed not to remember any lies. 
Nine of the 18 then proceed to give examples of lies, 4 
acknowledged such in conversations with the investigator 
later, leaving only 5 who were unqualified in their denial 
of falsehoods. All these five were 10-11 year old girls 
in a primary school for poor children, who were perhaps 
afraid to give truthful answers or who lacked ability to 
express themselves. (They were Jewish girls who did not 
know Polish well.} "Probably we are Justified in the con-. 
elusion that all children questioned had told lies." Of 
course these results must not lead to the conclusion that 
deceitfulness was habitual. The investigator quotes Ellen 
Key's:"It may be that one has told lies occasionally and 
yet have a sincere and honest character, and it may be 
that one has never in one's life told a lie and still be a 
thoroughly insincere person." 
Inveatigation by 13nehler nnr] Haas 
· (see reference in Preface) 
~1e second of the investigations under consideration 
was made in the second, third, fourth and fifth year 
classes in two Vienna public schools. 231 pupils in all 
answered the question "Is it ever necessary to lie?" (Gibt 
es Faelle in denen man luegen muss?") The question was giv-
en as the topic for a lesson in composition. The pupils 
were asked to give examples of cases in which in their es-
timation it is necessary to lie. URny children gave several 
. __ .___......_.. 
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examples, 36 of them declared that a lie is never 
necessary or professed to be unable to give examples, 
in all 312 examples were furnished by the children. The 
parents of the large majority of the pupils were from the 
laboring class; there were some small merchants and manu-
facturers and a very few professionals. The smaller num-
ber of subjects in an investigation less inclusive of 
phases of the problem, makes this study less valuable 
than the one previously discussed. Several implications 
of the conclusions reached by the investigator will be of 
interest to us, however. 
MOTIVES OF CHILDREN'S LIES 
-(1). As revealed in the investigation by Baumgarten 
(a). Comparison of school and home lies. 
In answer to the first two questions in the inquiry 
some children answer "I tell more lies at home", others, 
"I tell more lies at school". 90 say that they tell as 
many lies in one place as the other. 179{136bor3, 43 
girls) transgress oftener in the home, 106 {51 boys and 
55 girls) in th,sohool. There are 505 examples of 
~school-lies", which number includes 110 told in the 
home but occasioned by school conditions; of "home-lies" 
there are 5'13 (excluding the 110 mentioned above). The 
reasons for lying oftener in the school are of the same 
nature as those which apply to the home. "I tell lies 
home oftener because there are more reasons at home than 
in school"; "There is a bigger field for lies at home"; 
~------------------------------~~--~--~~~-=-•-~•~·~·~--~--=---r=-··-=·-~·==== 
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"At home one has to worm one's way out of all sorts of 
demands at every turn;" "I lie oftener at home because 
my parents are good to me and never bent me, in school 
I must be afraid my classmates will tell on me." Such 
~ 
reasons are paralleled by those who confess~more derelic-
"+0 
tions in school: "Of course I tell lies oftener in school, 
because there is more occasion to do it"; Without doubt I 
tell lies at school oftener than at home, because I know 
that I will be punished more severely at home than in 
school." (Comparisons cited.are all made by 14, 15 and lb 
year old pupils). Since the reaso~ given for both places 
Lthe oldeL_X~ils, 
are eo identical, one may surmise that the rnotfveTe;·for· 
probably the same) the d esirP. to ef:3cP. oe too onp,rous d9m~mds. 
b. Motives of "!ir~t lies". Or the 553 children rep-
resented only 193 answered the sixth question, "Do you 
remember your first lie?" with examples; and of these only 
90 mentioned the age at the time of the occurrence. The re-
mainder either state briefly that they do not remember the 
first lie or they mention the age at which they "began to 
lie". The investigator explains the few "instances of "first 
lies" and the fact that they are comparatively rare in re-
ports by young children, as a confirmation of the findings 
of child psychologists that the remembrances of early child-
hood are scant in number and that the younger the child the 
less he is able to give account to himself of the early hap-
penings he does remember. The investigator strangely never 
mentions the lesser ability of expression as a reason for 
the incomplete and less detailed returns of the younger child. 
-~; 
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The youngest children writing seem to have been aged 
eight, no earlier age is recorded on any example quot-
ed. But at eight, and even nine and ten and older, lim-
itations of vocabulary, of ability to spell and, for the 
younger children, ability to handle the pen, surely limit-
ed the returns to the inquiry. Since many children state 
'from this time on I began to lie', the conclusion is obvi-
ous that in many cases the remembrance is that of some es-
pecially significant occurrence. It must also be taken into 
consideration that not all cases of "first lies" really rep-
resent a first transgression, but that they are the earliest 
cases remembered. The earliest age mentioned in connection 
with a first lie is three years (two cases), 4 years is men-
tioned b times, the latest given is 13 years (~ases). The 
greatest number of cases (half of all mentioned) come in 
the sixth year." 
Dr. B. finds that the most recurrent motive for firot 
lies is the desire to satisfy a sweet tooth. Thirty-four 
cases are described by the children as occurring between the 
ages of 3 and 8. Herewith some interesting examples: 
"I told the mnid that Father wanted raisins and in the 
meantime I ate them all myself". (8-F) "When trother gave us 
cake I said I had not had any yet although I had had some". 
( 9-Y). "I was five years old, my father was very ill then • 
Uother sent for some·cough candy for Father. Father put it 
.into the night stand and I ate it all. He asked, where is 
the candy but I did not confess anything." 
;;u 
Yore complicated cases involve cheating and deceiv-
ing in order to get the desired goodies: "Once when I was 
not yet five years old, my mother gave me some nuts. .My 
sister asked me to divide them with her. I had no inclin-
ation to divide them, and when my sister left the room I 
put the nuts into my pocket. When she returned I said that 
I had eaten them all. The folks at home often remind me of 
this incident. At that time it was taken as a proof of my 
cleverness."(l3-M). "When I was 1 years -- one day when 
all my classmates had left the room I saw a kopek lying on 
a bench. Very happy to find it I took it and bought candy 
with it. The next day the friend who left the kopek there 
asked me wheth:er I had seen it. I saif, lfo." (1'/-F). 
There are cases of confession of thievery without 
mention of the use of the money taken. Probably, the in-
vestigator thinks, the desire to buy sweets was the motive 
in the case of these young children (6-8). The four cases 
cited are all from a school attended by children of poor 
parents. 
The other cause of the conscious first lie is f~und 
to be fear of punishment, either because of failure to meet 
various demands of parents or because of minor transgressions. 
The investigator quotes examples or which the following are 
typical: "When I was six years old I lied that I had wash-
ed myself when I had not". "I had not brushed my teeth and 
said that I had." "When I was six years old I did not like 
to eat. Once when I was left alone at breakfast I threw 
•• 
the breakfast roll out of the window." "I broke a doll 
and said it had fallen down by itself and broken." "The 
first time I lied in my childhood was when I broke a vase 
with flowers in it andthen said the cat had overturned it 
and so escaped reproof." "Oncewhen I was little I destroy-
ed a sparrow's nest in the garden and I lied to my father 
that my friend had done it." 
c. Under the two categories, lies for the eake of pos-
sessing and lies with the objeCt of concealment, Dr. B. 
cites many cases from the examples of later experiences giv-
en by the pupils. She points out the fact that in both clas~ 
sea the causes are more complicated. Children confess to 
cheating and stealing and then telling lies to cover those 
transgressions. Since life becomes more and more complicated-
the things desired become -·greater in number and not so much 
limited to sweets. 
The £ollowing oases may be considered typical: "One 
day we played ball, I, my brother and two cousins. Finally 
there were nine of us. The ball belonged. to one of my cous-
ins. I liked the ball very much, it was a foot ball. Sudden-
ly the ball flew into another yard. I was the first to 
come into the yard where it lay, and picked it up. Because 
I liked it I secretly went out of another gate with it. All 
looked for the ball, so did I. When I saw my cousin in great 
despair, however, I confessed my guilt and later I was very 
much ashamed."(ll-K). 
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More spheres of interest prompt to a greater var-
iety of secrets. The interests represented with examples 
of lies are reading, the movies, Play with comrades in 
forbidden places or at forbidden times: "Mother has not 
permitted reading of many books but I read two or three 
after each other every day."{l3-F). "My older brother 
brought the 'Storch' (A Polish comic usually forbidden 
to children because of erotic drawings and jokes) and lock-
ed it away in a little trunk. I searched for a key to open 
it and read Storch." "I lied to my aunt that I would go 
into the garden with my cousin but I went to the movie." 
(11-Y). "I and my brother told our father that we were go-
ing for a walk but we went to the Theatre Luna and came 
home and said we had not been anywhere". (11-U). One child 
tells at some length h~ she at the age of six had secretly 
disposed of a large p~rt of her dinner in the stove in order 
that she might the sooner go driving with her mother. 
d.Liea to avoid explanations. Beca1L~e of lack of under-
standing between parents and children many quit~ innocent, 
even altruistic acts frequently become occasions for un-
truthfulness: "One day I lost money and when I came home 
I said that I had left it at a friend's home. The next day 
I borrowed money from someone and gave it to my mother" 
(1}-F). "I lied that a lovely pencil had been given to me, 
but I had bought it with my own money; I lied because I did 
not want mY parents to be angry with me."(l;-F). "One day 
••• 
my mother sent me on an errand. In passing I saw a 
pauper, with a little girl huddled to him. I felt a great 
compassion for him and gave him 10 kopeks. When I cnme 
home, of course I did not have the money, mother asked me 
what I had done with it and I answered: lost it."(l2-F). 
After the age of 1~ there are many cases of prevar-
ication by both boys and girls to cover secret meetings 
on the streets and elsewhere. There are a number of con-
fessions of untruth to conceal facta from parents for no 
other reason but the dislike for discussion of personal 
matters. These, however, are not from children, but from 
. G.).1 ~ """ 
adolescents. Among the adolescent representativeshwho 
confess. to lies in order to elude forced church going or 
to pretend to a faith not shared with the parents. One 
twelve-year old boy is included among the former: "One day, 
on Sunday, I went out and told my parents that I was going 
to church, but I went into.the open to play."(l2-/. 
Dr. B. feels this sad picture of parent and child re-
lationship is much mitigated by ten cases of untruthfulness 
prompted by love of parents, such as this one, "My mother 
was sick and knew that I had complained of sore throat the 
day before. ~When she asked me whether my throat still 
hurt, in order to save her worry I said that nothing was 
hurting me, although I did have pain."(l2-F) • 
c. Fifteen cases of lies are cited for «hich the 
impetus was runb1 t1 an and desire for diatinctiQllo For in-
stance, "I lied once, when my mother had asked me why I 
v:ns always so quiet. Altho~h I am not the worst I wanted 
., 
my mother sent me on an errand. In passing I saw a 
pauper, with a little girl huddled to him. I felt a great 
compassion for him and gave him 10 kopeks. When I came 
home, of course I did not have the money, mother asked me 
what I had done with it and I answered: lost it."(l2-F). 
After the age of lj there are many cases of prevar-
ication by both boys and girls to cover secret meetings 
on the streets and elsewhere. There are a number of con-
fessions of untruth to conceal facts from parents for no 
other reason but the dislike for discussion of personal 
matters. These, however, are not from children, but from 
. ~ ~..,..t 
adolescents. Among the adolescent representatives~who 
confess. to lies in order to elude forced church going or 
to pretend to a faith not shared with the parents. One 
twelve-year old boy is included among the former: "One day, 
on Sunday, I went out and told my parents that I was going 
to church, but I went into the open to play."(l2-/. 
Dr. B. feels this sad picture of parent and child re-
lationship is much mitigated by ten cases of untruthfulness 
prompted by love of parents, such as this one, "My mother 
was sick and knew that I had complained of sore throat the 
day before. ~Vfuen she asked me whether my throat still 
hurt, in order to save her worry I said that nothing was 
hurting me, although I did have pain."(l2-F). 
c. Fifteen cases of lies are cited for ~hich the 
impetus was runb1 tian and desire far distinction. For in-
stance, "I lied once, when my mother had asked me why I 
vms always so quiet. Althotl,C,"'h I a'!l not the worst I wanted 
••• 
book,that I had written my composition ~ithout help, that 
I had solved my problem alone, I brought forged report 
signatures from Father, Mother, Brother, Sister, Uncle, 
Aunt, etc." A number of children justify their lies with 
the stntement that they find it impossible to meet the 
school re1uiremnts. 
· .Rote: The questions relating to attitude toward lies 
were evidently answered only by pupils beyond the age o~ 
intereot in our study. The numerous examples quoted rep-
resent adolescent opinion. 
2. Mot1 vee a.a reyealed in thf B,,ehler-He.e.s investigation 
1) 
The Buehler-Haas report tabulates the 312 examples of lies 
received according to their social significance: 
(Keeping secrets 
I. Social Lies(Sparing others and 
(giving pleasure 
Boys ) 
) 18 
) 
Transition (Lies o! embarrassment) {Phantasy lies ) 
II. Asocial lies( Fear ••••••••••••••• ) 
(Defense ••••••••••••• ) 
(Shame ••••••••••••••• ) (Greed ••..•..•..•••.• ) 
5 
1 
40 
Girls 
32 
14 
Transition (School lies ••••••••• ) 
(Deception of officials) 9 6 ( 
Antisocial (Hiding depredations.) 
III. Lies (Defrauding •.•••••••• ) 27 17 (Slandering •••••••••• ) 
100 100 
Vfuatever may be the categoric~ under which the in-
vestigators class the examples of lies receiweu, it is 
clear that desire and fear, chiefly fear of punishment, 
prompted quite the largest number, with more complex im-
(1) op. cit. p. 31. 
plications of the same causes as life grew more complex. 
3.Socia1 implications and roote of the~e motives 
{1). Influence of persons 
a. Imitation of and coercion by adults 
Buehler's investigation is interesting in its tab-
ulation of cases "when it is necessary to lie" with ref-
erence to the influence of adults evidenced. 38 percent 
of the examples given by the children represented lies of 
adults. Probably the child cited adults as examples in 
all cases where he was reticent about telling of his own 
lies. While that reduces the number of examplesfof child-
ren's lies desired it offers insight into the children's 
perception of the various prevarications of the adults 
about them. The author believes the ass~ption justified 
that not only reticence about their own lies impelled the 
children's exemplification by means of adult's lies, but 
that possibly adult lies heard made the more vivid · 
impression and were therefore remembered first. Perhaps, 
also, since the demand was for cases of justified lies, 
their respect for their elders made the children infer 
justified reasons when they noted falsehoods in the utter-
ances of parents, neighbors, etc. Ten percent of all cases 
mentioned were lies required of children by adults, making 
the total chargeable to adults 48 percent. Of the examples 
given by the '/-8 year old group only 25 percent are charge-
able to adults, the 11-12 year olds give 55 percent of adult 
examples. This is in part because the older child is better 
··-
:n 
able to detect falsehoods but also in part because it is 
he who is required by his parents to lie about his age on 
the railroad, tell the rent collector that there is no one 
at home etc. 
In this connection a contrast between the notations 
in the Scupin and Stern notebooks is interesting. As pre-
viously noted, the Stern children, in whose home truth-
telling and respect for a child's veracity and trust was 
taken for grante~, supplied no examples of actual lies dur-
ing the entire period under consideration. The Scupin child 
at the age of 1:11 showed distrust of his mother's word, 
and indUlged in occasional deceptions and near lies before (1) 
the age of three in spite of the great frankness evidenc-
ed in the examples quoted in previous chapters. These de-
ceptions p~obably have some relation to the maid's stories 
of a "Bubu" who was supposed to live back of the stove and 
whom the child feared greatly, and to the mother's practice, (2) 
reporte<l by her; "When, in his bath, his mother desires 
to wash his head, she uses since a half year the same al-
ways successful ruse, in order that the soap may not run 
into his eyes. She calls to him: 'See there on the ceil-
ing, the spidert' and he always fastens his eyes upon the 
indicated place as if charmed; sometimes he even professes 
to see the spider.' 
It maY be that the examples of the deceptions of their 
elders dull the possibly naturally (see Ch. IV) normal im-
( 1) op. cit. 139, lb.5, 49 cases· quoted by Stern) 
(2) op. cit. 139 also " " " 
• 
pulse to tell the truth, it may be that the "subjective 
asgurance of truth" does not have the opportunity to 
emerge as clearly and as quickly when experiences of de-
ceptions by res~cted elders cloud what might seem a clear 
relation between subjective assurance and the expression. 
b. Lack of 11naerstanding betwee~ ~eraope. No matter 
under what classification the home and the school and the 
"first lies" in the Baumgarten report are listed, the great 
majority of them find an aiding and abetting if not a prim-
ary reason in the lack of understanding be~7een the per-
sons involved, most often between parents and children. Th~ 
is clearly the-case in almost all the lies of fear and con-
cealment and in most of t~e lies of desire. "There are 
things which one keeps secret from ones parents only to avo~ 
troubling them. They are not really so terrible as parents 
think". "The first time I received a one (lowest grade) for 
my dictation, I did not tell my mother about it because I 
feared her reproaches and her anger;~ these are among the 
exaroples in the Baumgarten report paralleled by many in the 
other investigation. In both fields of investigation the 
lack of understanding of child nature on the part of parents 
is very manifest. "The relationship is obviously not based 
on mutual trust, on respect of the individualhty of the chiJd 
•••• parents do not see in the child a personality, as such 
demanding a certain degree of freedom of action, •••• In the 
lies of the children we therefore ace a reaction against 
such restraint, a defense of the ego, a defense of the in-
• 
(1) 
dividual's feeling and judgment". 
(2) Relation to economic stetes 
There are no statistics tabulating economic states 
of the homes involvea, but the reading of the two in-
vestigations reviewed forces the conviction that econ-
omic conditions are potent factors in the problem. Al-
though she gives no figures Dr. B. states that according 
to her inquiry poor children tell fewer lies than the child-
ren of the rich in the private schools. The Buehler in-
vestigation offers no basis for comparison as the examples 
come so very preponderantly out of poor economic condi-
tions, but in both investigations the reasons for lies 
given are in many cases necessarily eliminated when parents 
have more leisure, where adjustment to the environment is 
less hampered by the mnny ·restrictions incident to life in 
small quarters, by very ~cant financial resources, by the 
depressing atmosphere which sends children out to seek 
forbidden adventure. ; . In: this connection it is interest-
ing to note that only 23 percent of the returns in this 
inquiry interpreted the "necessary" in the question "Is it 
ever necessary to lie?" as having moral implications. 
The other '/1 percent interpreted it as implying practical 
necessities, as avoiding financial expense, escaping pun-
ishment, etc. A perusal of the material gathered in this 
investigation would make one understand why Schroetter 
(2) 
closes his study with the quotation: "Eliminate socio-
(1) Baumgarten op. cit. p. 80 
( 2) op. cit. p. 69 
,-------------------~~---~--~~----------- -------------- -----·------
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economic causes and you will eli~inate lies." However, the 
reading of the examples of the lies of rich children in the 
Baumgarten report would cau~e rmhes to be included with 
great poverty in these socio-economic causes. The many lies 
to escape pampering, to cover forbidden conversations with 
servants whose grammar might be contagious, forbidden play 
with children of other social levels, etc, show that wealth 
as well as poverty is responsible for many too onerous 
restraints upon the child's impulses for self determination. 
A study giving more exact returns on this particular ~hase 
of the problem would be most worth while. A comparison of 
the influence of different cultural levels would ~ossio~ly 
arrive at the crux of the ~roblem more directly. 
(3) Relation to methooa o:f edll(~j1on ana disci'Dline 
The example by a boy aged 11:10 typifies the prob-
lem of lies as related to discipline in the home: !'When 
one has broken a plate, glass, waterjug, or anything else, 
it is necessary to lie because otherwise one gets a whip-
ping or a scolding." Fear of punishment caused by unduly 
strict discipline and by a system of education based on 
coercion is the cause of practically all of the 505 "school-
(2) 
lies" reported in the Baumgarten investigation. Kensies, 
in his study of children's lies, co~ents: "It is assert-
ed by students or English education that English youth ex-
cels German youth in truthfulness in school, for the simple 
reason, that education makes lees use of compulsion and 
punishment." 
(1) Buehler, op. cit. p. 27 
(2) Kinderluegen,und Kinderaussa.gen, p. l'/9, quoted in 
Baumgarten op. cit. p. 85. 
• 
• 
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4. Develovmental J:'a.ctora 
( 1). A8e. 
The nature of the two inquiries discussed gives 
little reliable help on the question of age differences 
because the method used imposed great limitations upon 
the findings for earlier years. The inability of young 
children to express themselves adequately and the de-
pendence ~on necessarily inaccurate memory in the age 
designations of the "first lies" cited by the older 
children, militated agaim t reliability in the findings 
in this respect. In eo far as the data are useful they 
have been incorporated in this chapter, section 2(l)b., 
. 1llc •• .;,.. 
distinguiehingAof the earlier years from those of the 
J.ater. 
(2). Intelligence 
If the deduction from her material which Dr. Baum-
garten makee,that the more intelligent a child the more 
will he lie,.ie in harmony with facts, it is not warrant-
ed by her data. · The method used precludes a just compar-
ison of propensity to lying on the basis of number of lies 
reported, since the more intelligent children are able to 
think faster and nrite better than the less intelligent 
and would therefore make more co~plete and exact reports. (1) 
According to Franken's studies there seems to be some cor-
relation between intelligence and truthfulness. However, 
conditions were not well controlled in his experiment, and 
hie deductions on the basis of it are no more convincing 
(1). Auese.ge-Verauche quoted in Lowinsky op. cit. p. 385 
• 
• 
than are the reverse. deductions just cited by Baum-
garten. Studies of tile subject made to date offer 
nothing convincing on this ~hase of the ~roblem. 
5. Conclusions 
Children of school age have cooe to a discrimin-
ation between truth and falsehood and can tell lies with 
deliberation and persistence. Criteria o:f objectivity 
have been su~plied by experience and the "subjective as-
surance of truth" has emerged. The latter develo~ment 
is ~robablY delayed in the case of the ~ersistent ex-
ample of elders given to deception. The prom~tings for 
self-determination are strong, and most lies are occasion-
ed by the difficulties the child meets in maintaining hie 
individual thoughts and feelings against his environment. 
Many of these difficulties o~iginate in the undue restraint 
incident to coercive education and methods of discipline and 
to the repression which accompanies poverty, and perhaps 
also life at the opposite end of the economic scale. Lack 
of understandi~g between ~arents ana children is reason for 
many concealments and outright lies in the endeavor to avoid 
friction. The correlation bet\•:een a~e and intelligence and 
the pro~enaity to lying cannot pe determined,even tentative~ 
ly, from the data at hand • 
• 
• 
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SUMMARY 
It ~ay be that there 1s euch a thing 
as a "traitorous trueness" and a ''loyal deceit", 
however, the moral implications of the lie are 
not the subject of the pre~ent study, but the en-
deaver has been made to ascertain the psychological 
basis and im~lications of children's lies in so 
far as the available scientific material mak~£ 
this possible. 
As basis fpr further study the lie was char--
acterized as a C?nfl1ct between so~e element 1n the 
:nind content known to be true and so:ne ele:::Hmt known 
to be false, and the exprecaion of the false as true 
with the purpose of-influencing another person toward 
. ·. 
so~e end: The pre-requisite abilities co~prise (1) the 
ability to oake Judgments, specifically coopurutive 
jud6:nents with an end in view, (2) the ability to 
reco~nizo that which is valid in contrast to that 
which is false ("subjective assurance of vul1d1ty"), 
'3) a personality sense,or rather, a oocial sense, 
which sees the relation of persons to each other and 
to tho end in question, nn:'i ( 5) the cnp·: city for 
• 
• 
expression. With oo much of development a neces£ary 
pre-requisite to lying, it must be that the early 
untrue utterances of children cannot be classed as 
lies. 
Little children make many unconsciously untrue 
because of 
statements/a. l~ck of criteria of objectivity which 
only experience can supply, because of faulty memory, 
proneness to influence by suegestion, misunderstanding 
of the function of language and a limited vocabulary, 
disposition to a playful exercise of language and of 
th~ imagination. Develop!lent brings with it progres-
sive emergence of the subjectively true elements in 
the mind content in contradistinction to the false, 
and correspondence of these with objective truth. 
"Pseudo-lies", t:u~.t is interested U."ltrue state~ents 
which,do not·1nvolve sufficient e~:ercise of judgment 
to be ectual lies, can be kept, under favorable con-
ditions, from developing into a propensity to lyinc, 
if a child is given undereta.ndins help in overco,ins 
these aarly impulses to prevarication in the interest 
of self defense. 
The two investigations which have been the bcsis 
of our study of the lies of children of school uge 
lead to the conclusion that for yount children fear 
of punishment and desire for thinr:a to eat nre n::1ong 
the outstanding motives.for lies and that fear and 
desire are usually the underlyin::e motives in the la.t(!r 
• 
• 
years of childhood, although the occasions become 
more c?mplex and the interests which cause them more 
varied. Example, coercion, and lt:ck of understanding 
of elders are .at the root of many of the lies of 
childhood. Poverty and riches,respectively! by under-
anc overattentlon ns a chief reason, are predisposing 
fact?rs to children's lies, and so io, without queatio~ 
a coercive discipline in hoce and school. The relation 
of age to types of lies has been indicated above. Its 
relation to strength of the propensity, given there is 
a propensity, does not emerge from the results obtained. 
The conclusions relating the correlation of intelligence 
and truthfulness, respectively the tendency to decep-
tion, are not convincing because they are based on 
false premises. 
The present study seems to justify the conclu-
sion that many untrue statements must be expected while 
young children learn to discern what is objectively 
true and acquire an adequate medium of expression; 
also, that without hel~ 1n their ad;ustment to their 
envirofu~ent and in the mastery of thoir impulses 
a propensity to deception may develop, and that 
the faults of the environ~ent are in lorge measure 
responsible for the actual lies children tell. 
Whether, or in how far, r1~ht env:roncental con-
ditions wo~ld elimlnnt~ 11~- ie a question to 
which no answer can be ventured on t~e basis of 
available dota. 
r------------------------------------------------------------
• 
• 
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